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Abstract
A common theme in the contemporary medical model of psychiatry is that pathophysiological processes are cen-
trally involved in the explanation, evaluation, and treatment of mental illnesses. Implied in this perspective is that
clinical descriptors of these pathophysiological processes are sufficient to distinguish underlying etiologies. Psychia-
tric classification requires differentiation between what counts as normality (i.e.- order), and what counts as
abnormality (i.e.- disorder). The distinction(s) between normality and pathology entail assumptions that are often
deeply presupposed, manifesting themselves in statements about what mental disorders are.
In this paper, we explicate that realism, naturalism, reductionism, and essentialism are core ontological assumptions
of the medical model of psychiatry. We argue that while naturalism, realism, and reductionism can be reconciled
with advances in contemporary neuroscience, essentialism - as defined to date - may be conceptually problematic,
and we pose an eidetic construct of bio-psychosocial order and disorder based upon complex systems’ dynamics.
However we also caution against the overuse of any theory, and claim that practical distinctions are important to
the establishment of clinical thresholds. We opine that as we move ahead toward both a new edition of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual, and a proposed Decade of the Mind, the task at hand is to re-visit nosologic and
ontologic assumptions pursuant to a re-formulation of diagnostic criteria and practice.
Introduction
Psychiatry is uniquely problematic because debates over
what mental disorders are have presented substantial
challenges to medical praxis and ethics. In many ways,
the question of what constitutes a mental disorder is
related to uncertainties about the nature of mental
experience, and the underlying relationship(s) of body,
brain and mind. Traditionally, medicine has been suc-
cessful in establishing etiology of diseases and disorders,
and developing focal therapies based upon such
mechanistic conceptualizations. The acts of medicine (i.
e.- diagnosis, therapeutics, and prognosis) depend upon
the ability to distinguish between what is “normal” and
what is pathologic, and the evolution and practice of
psychiatry has attempted to adopt and utilize the medi-
cal model in this regard.
Yet, as neuroscience probes ever deeper into the
workings of the brain, it becomes evident that the
“mind” remains somewhat enigmatic, and thus, any
attempt to link mental events to biology must confront
what Chalmers has referred to as the “hard problem” of
consciousness [1]. But given the continued ambiguity of
the brain-mind relationship, unresolved questions
remain of 1) how can, and perhaps should psychiatry
proceed to formulate a viable system of characterizing
mental normality and abnormality, and 2) how might
such formulation affect the scope and tenor of psychia-
tric practice?
A ss e v e r a lp a p e r si nt h i sj o u r n a lh a v es h o w n ,s u c h
questions are not esoteric or merely academic. Rather,
in light of 1) ongoing progress in genetics and neu-
roscience; 2) development and tentative articulation of a
forthcoming Decade of the Mind; and 3) proposed
healthcare reforms that are based to a large extent upon
diagnostic classifications, these questions reveal genuine
challenges, and form the groundwork upon which a new
diagnostic schema (if not Diagnostic and Statistical
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and practice might be constructed.
Discussion
Problems in Psychiatric Diagnosis
Horwitz asserts that “because [diagnostic psychiatry]
uses symptoms to classify disorders, it also categorizes
an enormous diversity of human emotions, conduct, and
relationships as distinct pathological entities” [2]. At
first blush, such an approach seems logical because pre-
cise diagnostic classifications can presumably distinguish
between particular disease states and offer reliable infor-
mation about etiology, prognosis, and treatment. In the
The Myth of Mental Illness, Szasz disputed psychiatry’s
claims of medical legitimacy. Szasz was concerned about
the validity of psychiatric concepts, and his critique
raised questions about the evaluative nature of the psy-
chiatric enterprise. To Szasz, psychiatry utilized terms
(such as delusions, compulsions, and obsessions) that
lacked the descriptive objectivity of other domains of
medicine. Szasz did not deny that neuroanatomical
lesions could result in dysfunctional behaviors, however,
such abnormality is, strictly speaking, a brain disease.
Labeling various forms of behavior as pathological “...
rests on a serious, albeit simple, error: ... mistaking or
confusing what is real with what is imitation; literal
meaning with metaphorical meaning; medicine with
morals” [3]. If psychiatry lacked terms that could defini-
tively individuate normality from pathology, how could
psychiatrists issue seemingly objective diagnoses and
prognoses while relying on a predominantly subjective
(and elastic) epistemology?
This conceptual tension in psychiatry mirrors larger
debates about objectivity and normativity in the philoso-
phy of science. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
Thomas Kuhn argued that science does not operate
within an Archimedean framework, but instead, is sensi-
tive to the normative practices of social communities
[4]. Scientists (and clinicians) undergo training and
develop expertise within localized academic institutions.
As a consequence, intellectual traditions tend to bind
scientists and clinicians within a coherent community of
practitioners. Kuhn noted that members of a particular
academic community tend to hold similar constructs
and values about what constitute a good theory, and
these values were largely assumed, unquestioned, and
maintained as valid within the group. For Kuhn at least,
t h ec o l l e c t i v en a t u r eo fs c i e n t i f i ct h e o r y - b u i l d i n gs u g -
gested that communities’ values matter in the content
of scientific discourse and theorization (and, we might
add, clinical practice).
Postmodern criticisms of science generally impugn
this relativistic bend, and pose the question: If science
evolves within a cultural frame (just like other
ideologies), then in what sense is it immune from the
normative practices of society [5]? The crucial issue is
not whether the unique status of science (and by exten-
sion, clinical medicine) hinges on cultural biases, but
whether its epistemology is better than other ideologies
at obtaining knowledge about the natural world. All
ideologies manifest hegemonic assumptions about the
nature of reality and being. However, unlike other ideol-
ogies, science also values a self-correcting process
through which increasingly refined and robust charac-
terizations about the natural world can be made over
time. If new observations become difficult to reconcile
with standing hegemonic beliefs, then those initial
assumptions are usually abandoned. Thus, scientific
epistemology allows for large scale reorganization of
ontological assumptions, or what Kuhn called “paradigm
shifts” [4].
In applying this framework to the medical model of
psychiatry, we see a reliance upon four main ontological
assumptions. These are 1) Realism: the claim that men-
tal properties (such as desires, beliefs, and thoughts) are
real phenomena and not merely artifacts of socio-cul-
tural norms; 2) Naturalism: the concept that distur-
bances in neural structures are causally implicated in
the formation and persistence of mental disorders; 3)
Reductionism: the view that at some level, disturbances
in neural structures are necessary to account for mental
disorders, and 4) Essentialism: the assertion that mental
disorders have underlying ‘essences” that allow distinc-
tion of one type from another.
Are each and all of these assumptions warranted and
necessary in order to arrive at a valid concept of mental
disorder? We assert that naturalism, realism, and reduc-
tionism are reconcilable with advances in contemporary
neuroscience, but that essentialism has proven to be,
and may still be somewhat more problematic, vis-a-vis
the medical model of psychiatry, at least to date. Let us
examine each of these assumptions in turn.
Realism
The realist position asserts that terms used in scientific
theories map onto actual properties in the external
world, even if the relevant phenomena are not necessa-
rily observable. So, for example, sodium-gated ion chan-
nels or serotonin receptors all do, in fact, exist. Their
existence is not predicated upon our ability to perceive
them through our senses. Another important aspect of
realism is that properties referred to by scientific the-
ories are independent of our linguistic practices or
socio-cultural norms; hence, the amino acid glycine will
always have a hydrogen atom as its functional group.
This description holds true regardless of human
circumstance.
Realism entails that a mental realm does not exist
separately from the physical, and so an acceptance of
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is not an ontologically separate mental world, indepen-
dent of its physical instantiation in the brain. The idea
of an overriding mind, metaphysically independent of
t h eb r a i n ,b e c o m e su n t e n a b l ew h e nw er e a l i z et h a t
lesions to various regions of the brain have profound
consequences for subsequent subjective experience.
How would the mental realm causally interact with an
aphasic’s brain, given the loss of linguistic capabilities
due to an insult to the superior temporal gyrus or Bro-
ca’s area? Similarly, how are we to account for the gra-
dual loss of cognitive function in patients with
Alzheimer’s disease?
To experience disease is to be in a certain experiential
state. To use a rather overplayed computational meta-
phor, to have such an experience requires that one have
the requisite “hardware” (brain) and “software” (mind).
A rejection of dualism would logically mean that all
mental disorders are (in some way) biologically based.
The tenet claims that every mental process, pathological
or otherwise, arises in and from the brain [6]. It is
important to note that nothing has been claimed about
how neural structures causally produce mental states
(naturalism), or whether mental states are best under-
stood through their more basic, physical components
(reductionism).
Realism has been a rather controversial assumption in
the philosophy of psychiatry. An objection to the realist
case is that there is no reason to claim that mental prop-
erties, such as beliefs, doubts, desires, and fears actually
exist in the natural world. Moreover, as matter of fact,
such mental properties do depend on the normative con-
straints of local communities. According to Cash, “...peo-
ple’s intentions, beliefs, thoughts and decisions are
different in kind, not just in scale, from causal mechan-
isms in the brain. The nature of this ‘difference in kind’
can be revealed by considering the nature of the public
criteria we use to ascribe intentional states to one
another” [7]. The veridicality of intentional states often
depends upon the requisite conditions; intentional states
can mean or be about something. The property of about-
ness cannot be mapped onto reality in any law-like way.
One can sidestep this criticism by noting that realism
is best approached as an epistemological constraint. It is
not the case that the tentative plausibility of a certain
theoretical term commits us to finding its ‘real world”
equivalent. The validity of theoretical terms, that is,
their ability to appropriately map onto real world prop-
erties, is completely contingent on the congruency of
the associated theory with other established scientific
principles. Critics of realism often conflate the object of
scientific knowledge with the process of knowledge con-
struction. Fundamentally, science is an interpretative
process; it is something people do. Given that science is
a project of collaboration, it is empirically impure, rely-
ing on built-in explanations that become embedded in
the process of theory development. This does not mean
that science is merely a by-product of cultural practices.
Roy Bhaskar articulates the problem in this way:
“[M]en in their social activity produce knowledge
which is a social product much like any other, which
is no more independent of its production and the
men who produce it than motor cars, armchairs and
books... and which is no less subject to change than
any other commodity. This is one side of ‘knowl-
edge’. The other is that knowledge is ’of’ things
which are not produced by men at all: the specific
gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis, the
mechanism of light propagation. None of these
‘objects of knowledge’ depend upon human activity.
If men ceased to exist sound would continue to tra-
vel and heavy bodies fall to earth in exactly the same
way, though ex hypothesi there would be no one to
know it” [8].
Knowledge, in the form of theories and explanations,
is interpretational and should be regarded as a change-
able social product. This does not mean that the object
of any such knowledge is always dependent upon socio-
cultural constructions. Science describes entities of nat-
ure, but “proof” comes through our success in interpret-
ing, interacting with, manipulating (and often,
controlling) them.
Naturalism
Naturalistic theories of mind generally assume that
mental properties, such as thoughts or beliefs, are
derived from neurobiological structures in a causally
relevant way. In order to legitimize the naturalistic char-
acterization of a mental disorder, the observed clinical
expressions of behavior should have causal roots in biol-
ogy. This is not to claim that all mental behavior should
only be understood through biology, but rather that we
- as dynamic organisms within complex environments -
w i l lu n d o u b t e d l yb ei n f l u e n c e db yav a r i e t yo fi n t e r a c t -
ing variables, including biology.
A pressing question in naturalistic theories is how is
it, exactly, that neurobiological disorders can be causally
linked to certain behavioral outcomes? The steps impli-
cated in the causal chains from the biochemical to the
behavioral level(s) are vast and endless, and as Hume
noted, we cannot “see” causation [9]. In science, we
observe event regularities, and if such regularities occur
with sufficient frequency, then we tentatively accept
these observations as truly causal. Such observations are
affirmed through the use of statistical theories, which
provide a mathematical measure for the probability of
an event occurring solely by chance.
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refined the scientific process, the act of establishing cau-
sal relationships in the world long predates the develop-
ment of statistics, or even mathematics. Such reasoning
is possible because human beings have the capacity to
reason inductively and infer logical relationships from
data in, and obtained from the environment. Children as
young as three years old can make appropriate judg-
ments about novel stimuli and causally link processes
they have only observed in operation [10].
These types of observations have prompted many phi-
losophers (since Hume) to posit that causality can, at
best, be understood as event regularities. We cannot
determine by reasoning alone which of the observed (or
potentially unobserved) effects actually cause the phe-
nomena in question. To arrive at such conclusions,
however, is to be led astray by words. As Ross states, “...
to the extent that we have culturally universal intuitions
about causation, this is a fact about our ethology and
cognitive dispositions, rather than a fact about the gen-
eral structure of the world” [11]. In other words, natura-
listic intuitions are not evidence of their content.
Reductionism
Over the last few decades, neuroscience has elucidated a
biological basis for several mental disorders. These
developments have fuelled the quest to explain mental
properties by reducing them to an interaction of their
putative substrates. Given that interactions of neurobio-
logical structures are causally implicated in aberrant of
behavior, a logical paradigm would grant underlying
genetic and biochemical entities explanatory primacy.
Subjective experience and cultural influences can play a
role in psychiatric disorders, but the “true” explanatory
locus would rest in pathological structures and
functions.
Many of these overly reductionist tendencies can be
assuaged by revisiting some of Dennett’sw o r kt h a t
attempts to clarify the relations and predictions of men-
talistic behavior through the use of three levels of expla-
natory abstraction [12]. The first is the Physical Stance,
in which behavior could be predicted, in principle, from
physical laws governing the interactions of material com-
ponents. The second is the Design Stance, which predicts
behavior, not from an understanding of the physical con-
stitution of the mind, but through an understanding of
the mind’s purpose, function, and design. The final level
of abstraction is the Intentional Stance, which requires
neither an understanding of the physical constitution of
the mind nor any design principles, but instead predicts
behavior by considering what moves a rational agent
would make in a given circumstance.
The brain and its potential representations are a pri-
mary focus of neuroscience, and neuroscientific
information sustains both an evolving philosophy of
mind, and the profession and practice of psychiatry. But
it is important to recall that neuroscience, as a science,
remains a process, and in so far as people are working
on the common project of explanation, the objects of
knowledge need to be interpreted. Normativity cannot
be expunged from science, nor should it be. We make
sense of the world and explain it with our theories, and
it is inevitable that practical considerations will play an
important role in theory choice. This means that reduc-
tionism need not be the raison d’être for the naturalistic
project, but neither should it imply that reductionism is
not possible, in principle. It is important to note that
defining mental content in this way becomes a practical
consideration. Accordingly, behavior can be interpreted
using a level of abstraction that depends upon the needs
of the investigator (and/or clinician).
Essentialism
A more controversial ontological assumption of the
medical model of psychiatry is essentialism. This is the
claim that psychiatric disorders, as defined by clinical
nosology, map onto reality in a discrete way, and that
these disorders possess essential properties, without
which they would not be what they are. We argue that
this assumption is highly questionable, and that as cur-
rently conceived, is anachronistic at best, and remains
inconsistent with scientific thinking (at worst), and
therefore is in need of re-examination and revision.
Science routinely organizes its body of knowledge into
categories. How we sort things into categories largely
depends on what measures we value. That is, we classify
objects for a particular reason or to serve a specific
function; to these ends, classification schemes cannot be
arbitrary or random assortments. As Sadler notes, “...this
non-arbitrariness is essential to a classification because
it provides the basis for users with common purposes to
talk about the same things. For us to discuss ‘major
depression’ productively, we have to agree, in large part,
about what major depression is, and in what practical
context such a notion arises” [13].
An important concern for classification is the concept
of validity. The validity of a category is related to the
degree that it fits within a consonant body of explana-
tory theories. So, to group lungfish and cows in a simi-
l a rc a t e g o r yw o u l dr e q u i r et h a tt h e r ea r eg e n u i n e
motivations for doing so. If one were an evolutionary
biologist, such a grouping would align with what is
known about macro-evolutionary processes. If one were
a fisherman, the validity of such a pairing would seem
impractical.
A criticism of the construct of essentialism is found in
the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Summarizing the
Wittgensteinian view, Garth Hallett writes:
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tures, and say: “The colour you see in all these is
called “yellow ochre”... Then he can look at,p o i n t
to, the common thing.” But “compare this case: I
show him samples of different shades of blue and
say: “T h ec o l o u rt h a ti sc o m m o nt oa l lt h e s ei sw h a t
I call “blue”."’ Now what can be looked at or pointed
to save the varied hues of blue? And don’ts a y ,
“There must be something common, or they would
not, be called ‘blue,"’“ but look and see whether
there is anything in common at all” [14].
The crucial argument here is that the property of
“blue” is reliant, to some extent, upon practical consid-
erations and constraints.
Yet, a form essentialism persists in psychiatry. This is
clearly articulated by Robins and Guze who claim that,
“...the finding of an increased prevalence of the same
disorder among the close relatives of the original
patients strongly indicates that one is dealing with a
valid entity” [15]. In this framework, genetic and bio-
chemical factors are attributed as primary causes, and
the role of psychiatry is to locate these pathological qua-
lities within the physical brain. While experience does
p l a yar o l ei no n e ’s mental health, this model is decid-
edly oriented toward brain function. In this way, genetic
and biochemical causes are seen as exerting their influ-
ences uni-directionally and any/all manifest symptoms
are the consequence of unique and individuated
etiologies.
The medical model of psychiatry views the current
classifications as representing discrete organic disease
states as opposed to heterogeneous symptom clusters.
Validation of these symptom clusters often occurs via
post-hoc quantitative and statistical analyses (such as
hierarchical cluster analysis or pattern recognition para-
digms) of the clinical data to ascertain which combina-
tions of symptoms tend to group together. The problem
with creating these types of discrete definitions for
many contemporary psychiatric conditions is that “...no
amount of clustering can get around the fact that sev-
eral variables used in such models may have little or no
biological plausibility” [16]. Without clear biological
mechanisms, it is unclear whether symptom clusters
represent different ways of labeling the same affliction,
socio-cultural influences, or other biological confounds.
Peter Zachar and Nick Haslam have presented a strong
case that psychiatric categories do not uniformly indi-
viduate to underlying essences, but are defined, to a
large part, by practical considerations [17-24]. In many
ways, this recalls the Szaszian argument for mental ill-
ness as “myth” - here literally used to denote a practical,
explanatory narrative.
We do not refute, or even doubt that practical consid-
erations are important to define the threshold(s) at
which a particular set of signs and symptoms may be
deemed clinically relevant. But, if we are to regard
essentialism as critical to the medical model of psychia-
try, and adopt practice standards in accordance, then
the task at hand is to establish how and what essential
criteria are pertinent to any construct of normality and
order (versus abnormality and disorder), as relates to
brain function, mental processes and expressions of cog-
nition, emotion and behavior (within a social milieu).
Toward this end, we have posited that one such “essen-
tial” element of normality is non-linear adaptive proper-
ties within and between particular brain networks; thus
progressive linearity would be aberrant and could mani-
fest effects from the cellular to the cognitive-behavioral
(and even socio-cultural) levels [25]. In this way, mental
disorders would occur as a spectrum of possible effects.
We maintain that particular genotypic factors predispose
endo- and exophenotypes that are differentially
expressed through interaction(s) with internal and exter-
nal environmental influences throughout the lifespan,
thereby grounding neuropsychiatric syndromes to
underlying biological factors [25,26].
This acknowledges causal determinants of psychiatric
disorders (at least at formal and material levels), and
while accepting a form of token physicalism (i.e.- that
particular mental events occur as result of some physical
function(s) or dysfunction(s)), allows for appreciation of
both emergence and the bio-psychosocial influence of
environments. As well, the spectrum disorder concept
satisfies the criteria that define the medical model (i.e.-
realism, naturalism, reductionism, essentialism). In this
light, a spectrum disorder can be considered to 1)
involve neural substrates (i.e.- realism); 2) represent a
disturbance in the natural function of the substrate(s) or
system (i.e.-. naturalism); 3) be a perturbation or disrup-
tion of some underlying and/or contributory component
(s) of the bio-psychosocial organism (i.e.- reductionism -
in this case as token physicalism), and 4) manifest a par-
ticular “eidos“ that defines its aberrant qualities - in this
case the progressive loss of non-linear adaptability and
the resultant effects on neural function, cognition, emo-
tion and behavior (i.e.- essentialism).
Conclusion
Psychiatry has increasingly adopted a categorical
approach in delineating mental disorders. This has been
beneficial insofar as the defined categories reflect clear
and well-understood biological mechanisms. For certain
psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, and other psychoses that involve clear dysfunc-
tions of mechanisms that regulate perception, cognition,
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sonable [2]. Human beings, however, have a range of
behaviors whose normality or pathology is constrained
within certain socio-cultural niches. Various phobias,
compulsions, obsessions, and emotions cannot easily be
explained by a singular biological mechanism. As well,
manifestations of the same condition may be the result
of heterogeneous mechanisms working in concert.
Essentialism is evidently important to the medical
model, and as such persists in contemporary psychiatry.
One of the central tenets in essentialism is the existence
of natural kinds. According to Zachar, a natural kind is
“...an entity that is regular (nonrandom) and internally
consistent from one instance to the next” [24]. That is,
once the property that captures the essence of a specific
natural kind is known, that property can identify any
other prototypical instantiation of that kind with accu-
racy. But, if a category cannot be identified with respect
to its essential properties, then such a category is not, in
the strict definitional sense, a natural kind, but an artifi-
cial category.
Rom Harré argues that the philosophy of science is
such that the idea of a ‘natural kind’ is a fancy, and that
a ‘natural kind’ is a concept which can only be under-
stood within the double framework of practice and the-
o r y[ 2 7 ] .T h ev a l i d i t yo fac a t e g o r yi sc o n t i n g e n tu p o n
how well it integrates within a diverse, multidimensional
system of fact(s) and explanation(s). While the theoreti-
cal context of the kind determines, via appropriate hier-
archical explanations, what properties constitute an
entity’s essence, it is the practical context that distin-
guishes accidental properties from essential ones, and
we opine, perhaps more importantly, what extent of
properties will be deemed relevant to regard and guide
action(s).
To be sure, physiological systems function and inter-
act nonlinearly over a wide range of spatial and tem-
poral scales. As Goldberger notes, “...the combination of
nonlinearity and non-stationarity, more the rule than
the exception in the output of physiologic systems,
poses a major challenge to conventional bio-statistical
assessments and standard reductionist modeling strata-
gems” [28]. Biological systems (including the embodied
brain-mind) display complex network properties, and
behavioral processes are often best characterized as
non-linear interactions between physiological systems
and the environment [29]. The extent to which the
activity of the system as a whole reflects the response(s)
of its component networks will vary based upon the
condition of the system and its sensitivity, and relative
attractors and constraints that exist; each and all of
these may be differentially expressed in certain indivi-
duals, at various points throughout the lifespan. More-
over, there is evidence to suggest that the activity and
response-parameters of constituent parts and networks
(i.e.- “bottom-up” e f f e c t s )m a yb er e s p o n s i v et o ,a n d
affected by the activity of the entire system as a whole -
inclusive of psycho-social factors in which it is nested (i.
e- “top-down” effects) [30].
Therefore, it remains an open question whether there
are essential parameters that characterize these non-
linear dynamical patterns. We believe that the afore-
mentioned refined eidetic conceptualization shows some
promise, and in this way might provide a “missing link”
between the medical model and psychiatry. Further
research in neuropsychiatry will need to reassess the
role of spatial and temporal scales in diseased organ-
isms. Mental disorders, like all other dysfunctions, are
processes that unfold through time. It is important to
heed Ghaemi’s advice, and recall that etiology is not a
binary issue, but instead involves elements of degree
[31]. In light of this, we posit that one of the benefits of
the spectrum concept is that it allows categorization of
mental disorders according to the extent and type(s) of
relatedness conferred by 1) common genetic risk and
predisposing factors, 2) dysfunction of shared substrates
and networks, and 3) benefit from types of treatments
that have identifiable effects/actions.
An understanding of mental normality and pathology
necessitates an approach that embeds it in the complex
spatial and temporal processes of life. Yet, we must be
cautious - despite the attractiveness and popularity of
complexity science, it is important to ground any such
account to well-established fact(s), and appreciate the
limits of what is known and un-known. As Jaspers
noted, “every concrete event - whether of a physical or
psychic nature - is open to causal explanation in princi-
ple, and psychic processes too may be subjected to such
explanation. There is no limit to the discovery of causes
and with every psychic event we always look for cause
and effect” [32], but he also adds that “...reality is seen
through the spectacles of one theory or another. We
have therefore to make a continual effort to discount
theoretical prejudices...and to train ourselves to pure
appreciation of facts...every advance in factual knowl-
edge means an advance in method...” [33]
At some point, the distinction between what is normal
and abnormal, ordered and disordered will need to be
made, and any such distinction must be practical in the
sense of its viability to sustain the good of patient-cen-
tered clinical care. Therefore, it may be that the task
(for the Decade of the Mind project, development of the
DSM-V, and for psychiatry, if not medicine, writ large)
is to clarify how syndromes are related (within various
spectrum disorders), and adapt or create a classification
scheme, nomenclature (and thus ontology) that commu-
nicates the meaning and value of taxonomy and diagno-
sis. Whether an attempt to elucidate the “natural basis”
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tical ends remains to be seen, and thus, this goal
remains a work in progress.
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